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Politicians looking forward to the next election, upon learning from
pollsters that the public believes inflation to be the nation's most impor-
tant economic problem, should be observed without exception to espouse
and implement measures to eliminate inflation. Since inflation is defined
as growth in the dollar (or "nominal") value of aggregate spending that
exceeds the growth of real output, those measures would appear to
involve achieving slower growth of nominal expenditures through budget
cuts, tax increases, and tight monetary policy. If restrictive demand
management policy were like a headache remedy that delivered an
instant cure with no side effects, it would elicit little controversy and
would be observed to be always and everywhere in place in any nation
experiencing even a small amount of inflation. But the failure of most
industrial nations consistently to pursue a restrictive policy suggests that a
better analogy would be a powerful anticancer drug that has long-lasting
and painful side effects.
Any reduction in the growth of nominal spending, no matter how it is
achieved, must by definition be divided between a decline in the rate of
inflation and a decline in the growth of real output. The success of
restrictive demand policies depends largely on the speed with which
inflation responds to a sustained reduction in nominal spending growth.
An instant and complete response means that real output is insulated
from the policies. But a slow and partial response means that real output
must take up the slack, with a resulting drop in production, accompany-
ing layoffs and unemployment, and bankruptcies of some individuals and
firms. These painful side effects dampen the enthusiasm of politicians for
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restrictive policies and lessen the chances that they will actually be
implemented. Often the temptation has been to avoid a painful cure for
the basic causes of the inflation disease and instead to dull its pain with
remedies, including financial reforms and indexation, that are aimed at
reducing its costs rather than reducing its magnitude.
How does inflation respond to nominal spending changes? Pessimists
assert that the first-year degree of responsiveness is only 10%; a decelera-
tion of nominal spending growth from 10 to 0% would initially cause a 1%
deceleration of inflation and a 9% drop in the growth of real output
(Okun 1978). It is easy for proponents of this "l-to-9 split" to show that a
serious attempt to stop inflation with restrictive demand management
policy could involve more than $1 trillion in lost output. In contrast some
argue that inflation can be stopped at a much lower cost. Fellner (1979)
claims that inflation will respond more promptly to a "credible" (i.e.
consistent and sustained) demand restriction than to the inconsistent and
short-lived restrictions observed in historical data. Sargent (chapter 2 of
this volume) points to the abrupt halt of four hyperinflations as evidence
that drastic changes in policy can achieve instant results.
This paper assembles a wide variety of historical evidence on the speed
and extent of response of the inflation rate to temporary and permanent
changes in the growth rate of nominal spending. Rather than weaving a
web of econometric equations to explain the data (a task performed
elsewhere), we limit ourselves to a pictorial history that illustrates the
highly divergent responses of inflation in six United States episodes since
1916, and in eight countries since the mid-1960s (West Germany, Switzer-
land, France, Japan, the United States, Italy, Brazil, and Israel). The
primary purpose of the paper is to present the data in a novel graphical
format in order to inform public discussion; a secondary purpose is to
determine major differences among the fourteen examples that may help
to identify those most relevant to the likely behavior of the United States
in the 1980s.
1.1 Identities Linking Nominal Demand, Inflation, and Output
A few simple identities help to clarify the necessary relationship be-
tween price adjustment and the evolution of real output. Throughout we
take the exogenous nominal aggregate demand variable to be nominal
GNP. By definition the log of nominal GNP (Y) must be divided between
the log of the GNP deflator (P) and the log of real GNP (Q):
(1) Y=P+Q.
Taking the derivative of (1) with respect to time and using the notation
that percentage changes per unit of time are designated by lowercase
letters, we have13 Why Stopping Inflation May Be Costly
(2) y=P + q,
which states that any change in nominal GNP must be divided between a
change in the aggregate price level and a change in real GNP. Next we
subtract from both sides of equation (2) the trend, or "natural," growth
rate of real GNP (q*) and use a "hat" to designate variables defined as the
net of that trend growth rate of real output:
(3) y-q*=P + (q-q*);
y^p + q.
Thus any excess of nominal GNP growth over the trend growth of real
output (y), which we call "adjusted" nominal GNP growth, must be
accompanied by some combination of inflation (p) and a deviation of real
output from trend (q). Since the latter must be zero in the long run, any
permanent acceleration or deceleration of adjusted nominal GNP growth
must be accompanied by exactly the same acceleration or deceleration of
inflation (we neglect any feedback from output or price fluctuations to the
natural growth rate of output). To the extent that the long-run growth
rate of the money supply is the basic determinant of the long-run be-
havior of nominal GNP, and both money and nominal GNP are exogenous,
equation (3) is a way of restating the claim that in the long run "inflation is
always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon" (Friedman 1963).
Over shorter business-cycle frequencies, equation (3) states that
fluctuations in nominal GNP growth must be divided between price and
output fluctuations. Real GNP can be stable only if price changes exactly
mimic the proportional change in nominal GNP, and any tendency for
prices to adjust only partially to nominal GNP cycles must imply procycli-
cal fluctuations in real GNP. For instance, if the rate of change of prices
over the business cycle is always equal to some constant fraction (a) of the
adjusted nominal GNP movement, then deviations of real GNP from trend
must soak up the remaining fraction (1 - a):
(4) p = ay,
q = y-p = (l-a)y.
Can one proceed from the identity expressed in (4) to the significant
proposition that an economy with relatively sticky prices (a small a) must
exhibit correspondingly larger fluctuations in real output? That would
follow, other things being equal, except insofar as the responsiveness of
prices themselves influenced the amplitude of fluctuations in nominal
GNP.
1.2 A Graphical Representation of Alternative Adjustment Paths
Because the top line of equation (4) is a relation between only two
variables, the inflation rate (p) and adjusted nominal GNP growth (y), it14 Robert J. Gordon
can be displayed on a simple diagram that plots/? on the vertical axis and y
on the horizontal. If the price adjustment coefficient (a) were unity, then
inflation would respond instantly and completely to changes in the growth
of aggregate spending, and the locus of inflation rates accompanying
different rates of demand growth would appear to lie along a 45 degree
line, as in figure 1.1a. Because inflation would absorb all of the variation
in nominal demand, there would be no divergence of real output from its
trend growth path (q = 0). In contrast figure 1.1b plots a completely
unresponsive inflation rate that remains at zero whether adjusted de-
mand growth is +5, - 5, or 0%. Because the adjustment coefficient (a)
is zero, equation (4) states that all variations in nominal demand growth
are completely absorbed in deviations of real GNP from trend. The verti-
cal distance between the 45 degree line and the horizontal line in figure
1.1b shows changes in detrended output growth. For instance, a 5%






















Fig. 1.1 Hypothetical relations between inflation and demand growth.15 Why Stopping Inflation May Be Costly
real output in excess of its trend, as represented by the line segment
marked AB.
An intermediate case depicted in figure 1.1c exhibits partial price
adjustment, with the coefficient a equal to 0.4 rather than unity or zero.
From an initial situation at point E with both inflation and adjusted
nominal demand growth equal to 0%, a temporary acceleration of de-
mand growth to 5% would raise inflation to 2% at point B, with the
remaining 3% absorbed by real output growth in excess of trend (this is
the distance AB). Similarly, negative demand growth would be split
between negative inflation (an actual drop in the price level) and a decline
in real output relative to trend.
So far we have examined only instantaneous responses to inflation—
with a complete response in figure 1.1a, no response in figure 1.1b, and a
partial response in figure 1.1c. More realistic is an adjustment that is both
partial and gradual, with the response in the initial period augmented by a
further reaction in the second and subsequent periods if demand growth
remains above its initial level. A simple dynamic adjustment process, that
allows inflation fully to absorb all of nominal demand growth in the long
run, can be written
(5) pt=ayt+(l-a)pt_u
where the subscripts distinguish variables measured in the current period
(t) from those applying in the last period (t - 1). Equation (5) states that
current inflation is a weighted average of this period's adjusted nominal
demand growth and last period's inflation rate, with weights adding up to
unity. In one extreme case when a = 1, inflation responds completely to
current demand growth, past inflation is irrelevant, and the inflation-
demand relation lies along the 45 degree line, as in figure 1.1a. In the
opposite extreme case when a = 0, inflation stays at the same rate forever
and demand growth is irrelevant, as in figure 1.1b. Between the extremes
inflation exhibits a gradual and delayed adjustment to changes in de-
mand. If, for instance, a = 0.4 and demand growth temporarily were to
increase from 0 to 5% for two periods and then return to zero, we would
have the situation shown in table 1.1.
This gradual adjustment path is plotted as the solid line in figure l.ld,
and the numbers on the solid line indicate the economy's location in each
of the first four time periods. The column in table 1.1 labeled qt shows the
detrended growth rate of real output, i.e. adjusted nominal demand
growth minus inflation, and Qt shows the cumulative departure of real
output from its trend {Qt is the log of a ratio and thus equals zero when
output is on its trend). The temporary acceleration of nominal GNP
growth causes above-normal output growth, followed by below-normal
output growth, that eventually returns the level of output to its trend.
Now compare the "box" formed by the solid line in figure l.ld with an16 Robert J. Gordon
Table 1.1 Response of Inflation to a Temporary
Acceleration in Nominal Demand Growth
Time































alternative box formed by the dotted lines that represent the adjustment
to the same nominal demand disturbance when a is set at 0.1 instead of
0.4. The larger is a and thus the more complete is the short-run response
of inflation, the steeper are the top and bottom sides of the box.
An important failing of the adjustment equation (5) is that it allows
output to depart permanently from trend when there is a permanent
acceleration or deceleration in demand growth. Consider a case in which
adjusted nominal GNP growth accelerates permanently from 0 to 5%,
roughly what occurred in the United States in the 1960s. At first, accord-
ing to (5), inflation will accelerate by less than 5% , but eventually will
reach a 5% rate. This means that initially output grows faster than its
trend, eventually reaching its trend, but never falls below trend. Thus the
level of output remains permanently above trend by an amount which
equals 7.5% in this example when a = 0.4. In short, equation (5) violates
the "natural rate hypothesis" that the level of real output is independent
in the long run of the rate of growth of nominal demand.
A more realistic adjustment equation would allow inflation to respond
not only to the rate of growth of nominal demand but also to last period's
deviation of real output from trend:
(6) pt = ajp,+ ££),_!+ (1 -<*)/>,_!.
The adjustment of inflation to a permanent increase in the rate of nomi-
nal demand growth includes a temporary period of overshooting during
which inflation exceeds its long-run value and real output growth falls
below its trend, thus eliminating the initial bulge in the level of output.
1.3 Stopping Inflation in Pictures
Since the main interest of United States policymakers is in stopping an
ongoing inflation of about 10%, let us examine alternative paths of17 Why Stopping Inflation May Be Costly
adjustment of inflation to a permanent drop in adjusted nominal demand
growth from 10 to 0%. If the adjustment parameter a were equal to unity,
inflation would respond instantly and completely, and there would be no
deviation of output from trend. Any value of a below unity, however,
causes output to fall temporarily below trend, and causes the negative
detrended level of output to pull down inflation by an amount which
depends on the p coefficient in equation (6).
Two basic approaches have been suggested to stop inflation through
restrictive demand management policy. The first, sometimes called the
"big bang" or "cold turkey" technique, would instantly drop adjusted
nominal demand growth to zero, the rate compatible with stable prices in
the long run. Such an approach would eventually bring the inflation rate
to zero, according to equation (6), but would impose a cost in lost output
if the adjustment coefficient (a) were less than unity. Let us imagine that
the response of inflation to an output gap ((3) is 0.2 and the length of a
time period is a year, so that a 5% shortfall of output below trend would
cause a one percentage point slowdown in the inflation rate each year.
For any given value of this (3 coefficient, the speed of the economy's
adjustment to the "cold turkey" remedy would then depend on the value
of a. Table 1.2 shows for two sample values of a (0.4 and 0.1) the
enormous difference in the economy's adjustment path when adjusted
demand growth is held at zero from the first year onward.
The "cold turkey" policy cures inflation quickly in both cases, in the
third and fourth years, respectively. But the output cost is severe, with a
maximum drop of the detrended output level of 8.2 and 16.7%, respec-
tively, from the initial period. And worse yet, the apparently stable policy
of maintaining nominal demand growth at zero creates enormous insta-
bility in the economy, with continuing cycles in inflation and real output.
When a = 0.4 these cycles damp out after a decade, but when a = 0.1 the
inflation rate overshoots to a value of minus 7 percent in year 7, and the
enormous shortfall of inflation below nominal demand growth propels
Table 1.2 Economy's Adjustment Path in Response
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real output into an enormous boom that pushes it from 16.7% below
trend in year 4 to 12.6% below trend in year 10, comparable to the
1939-43 explosion of real output in the United States.
The smaller the a adjustment coefficient, the greater the degree of
instability created by a "cold turkey" policy, and hence the less likely that
any such policy will actually be implemented. A less drastic alternative
would be a "gradualist" policy that reduces the rate of nominal demand
growth by, say, two percentage points a year, from an initial 10% to 0%
in year 5. As shown in figure 1.2 (which continues to assume that
(3 = 0.2), the relatively high a adjustment coefficient of 0.4 in the upper
frame makes the inflation rate "cling" relatively closely to the 45 degree
line and minimizes the output cost of stopping inflation. The maximum
output shortfall below trend in the top frame is 6.7% in year 5, less than
with the "cold turkey" policy; the cost of this advantage is a two-year
delay in achieving zero inflation. Along the dotted line in the bottom
frame, where a = 0.1, the maximum output loss reaches — 14.2%, the
inflation rate overshoots to —5.6% in year 9, and the output ratio
overshoots to + 10% in year 12.
1.4 The Scissors of Demand and Supply
Economists are used to treating every economic relationship as involv-
ing a trade-off between benefits and costs. From the point of view of
policymakers, however, figures 1.1 and 1.2 illustrate that the phe-
nomenon of gradual inflation adjustment (a small a) involves only costs,
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Fig. 1.2 Alternative responses to gradualist disinflationary policy.19 Why Stopping Inflation May Be Costly
analysts trace gradual price adjustment in the United States to three-year
staggered union wage contracts, in which case the benefits might appear
to be a reduction in the costs of negotiations and strikes, but there is
ample evidence that the phenomenon long antedates modern labor con-
tracting institutions (Gordon 1981a).
The historical examples presented in the next sections suggest that
prices exhibit a speed of adjustment that varies over time and across
countries. In some examples it is possible to discern patterns that display
striking similarities to the simple examples displayed in figures 1.1 and
1.2. But other patterns appear as well. In the 1970s the inflation rate in
the United States and some other countries exhibited variations that
cannot be attributed solely to prior changes in the rate of demand growth.
Imagine a situation in which an increase in the relative price of oil
temporarily boosts the inflation rate while policymakers adopt a "neu-
tral" policy stance, maintaining a constant rate of nominal GNP growth.
The plot of the inflation-demand relation in our diagram would exhibit a
vertical movement, first north and then south. Similarly, the imposition
of price controls together with a neutral demand policy would cause a
vertical movement to the south, and then back to the north if prices
rebounded after controls were abandoned.
Other patterns are possible as well. Monetary accommodation in re-
sponse to a supply shock would lead to an initial movement to the
northeast, moving along the 45 degree line itself in an economy like Israel
with very rapid price adjustment. The opposite of accommodation, an
extinguishing monetary policy, would lead to a northwest movement
following an oil shock, as in the United States in 1973-74, and a southeast
movement following the imposition of price controls, as in the United
States in 1971-72. Graphs for the 1970s in the United States are strikingly
different in appearance from those in earlier decades and in the hypo-
thetical cases of figures 1.1 and 1.2, providing vivid evidence that the
inflation experienced by the United States during the past decade must be
understood as resulting from an interaction of supply and demand
shocks, not as a delayed adjustment to demand shocks alone.
1.5 Examples from United States History
There are no examples in United States history before the 1950s of a
conscious attempt by policymakers to stop an ongoing inflation. Never-
theless earlier episodes are of interest, since they reveal evidence of the
same basic obstacle facing current United States policymakers—the phe-
nomenon of gradual price adjustment. For each period since 1916 during
which there was important variability of the inflation rate, we display
graphs arranged like figures 1.1 and 1.2. All the plotted figures for the
United States are four-quarter moving averages of quarterly data; e.g.20 Robert J. Gordon
the first observation plotted in figure 1.3 represents a rate of growth for
the GNP deflator of 6.7% and for adjusted nominal GNP of 14.0%, respec-
tively, in the four quarters ending in the first quarter of 1916, "1916:1"
(these pre-1947 quarterly data are developed and analyzed in Gordon
19816, and Gordon and Wilcox 1981; all figures use as the output trend
the "natural output" series from Gordon 1981c, appendix B).
1. A unique example of rapid price adjustment, 1916-24. The plot of
the 1916-24 experience in figure 1.3 combines several different subepi-
sodes, but the major impression is of extremely flexible prices. The
plotted four-quarter rates of inflation varied from + 24.3 to - 21.7%, an
enormous range, and the economy in both the peak and trough quarters
for inflation adhered quite closely to the 45 degree line. In just a year and
a half, between 1920:1 and 1921:3, the four-quarter inflation rate fell
from + 20 to - 26% and real output fell only 8% relative to trend, so that
about 85% of the drop in nominal GNP was absorbed by lower prices and
only the remaining 15% by lower real output. Another period with very
-30
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flexible prices was between 1916:1 and 1917:3, when the path traced by
the observations in figure 1.3 is actually steeper than a 45 degree line.
Between the 1916-17 increase in inflation and the 1920-21 collapse in
prices, there was an intermediate period that reflects government in-
tervention in the price-setting process. Beginning in early 1918 partial
price controls were implemented (Rockoff 1980), and this pushed the
adjustment path in a vertical downward direction. Then in 1919 as the
rate of nominal demand growth fell rapidly, the inflation rate remained
almost constant, probably reflecting a partial postcontrols "rebound"
effect, as occurred again in 1946 and 1974.
Starting in early 1922, the price adjustment path becomes visibly
flatter, between 1922:1 and 1923:2 inflation absorbed only 40% of
changes in nominal demand, against expressed as four-quarter changes,
and over the following three quarters only 20%. As we shall see, these flat
partial adjustment paths have been typical of United States experience
since 1922 (and also before 1916—see Gordon 1981ft). The 1916-22
experience of rapid price adjustment seems to be a historical aberration,
reflecting the ability of economic agents to change their price-setting
practices when they are universally aware of a special event (wartime
government purchases and deficit spending) that has a common effect on
costs and prices. The 1920-21 decline in price presumably reflects a
widespread belief that the wartime price "bubble" had ended as occurred
after the War of 1812 and the Civil War. Price behavior returned to its
usual gradual adjustment path after 1922, reflecting a general belief that
normal peacetime conditions had returned and that local industry-spe-
cific disturbances to costs and prices were now large relative to any
common aggregate disturbance.
2. The Great Depression, 1929-37. During the dramatic years that
followed 1929, the four-quarter rate of adjusted nominal GNP growth was
even more variable than during World War I and ranged from — 36% in
1932:2 to + 26% in 1934:1. Yet the response of inflation was much more
like the peacetime expansion of 1922-23 than the World War I experi-
ence. The four quarters of maximum nominal spending decline (ending in
1932:2) were accompanied by a "price absorpfion" amounting to only
33%, with 67% absorbed by real output. Over the entire period of
fourteen quarters between the economy's 1929:3 peak and 1933:1 trough,
prices absorbed only 38% of the nominal spending decrease. The plot in
figure 1.4 thus appears to resemble the hypothetical cases drawn in figure
1.1c and I.Id, which assume an absorption of 40%.
Just as the inflation rate displayed vertical jumps in 1918 when price
controls were introduced, so the inflation rate jumped in the last half of
1933 as a consequence of the National Recovery Act. The southeast
movement of the plotted line between mid-1934 and late 1935 can be
interpreted as the gradual elimination of the initial impact of the NRA,22 Robert J. Gordon
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Fig. 1.4 United States, 1929-37.
which was declared unconstitutional in mid-1935. Price adjustment con-
tinued to be gradual after the "price blip" connected with the NRA had
faded away; adjusted nominal GNP growth in the four quarters ending in
1937:1 of 15.4% was reflected in an inflation rate of only 4.1%.
3. World War II and its aftermath, 1940-49. During the early period of
accelerated United States war production, between early 1940 and early
1941, there was virtually no response of inflation to the spending boom,
as illustrated in figure 1.5. In fact it is interesting to compare, as is done in
table 1.3 two four-quarter periods in World Wars I and II having virtually
identical rates of adjusted nominal GNP growth. The small response of
inflation in late 1940 and early 1941 may provide evidence supporting an
adjustment mechanism like equation (6) above, in which both the rate of
nominal GNP growth and the level of the output gap have independent
effects on the inflation rate. In the subsequent year ending in 1942:1, as a
rapid expansion in output quickly eliminated the output gap, inflation
surged ahead, absorbing 75% of adjusted nominal spending growth.23 Why Stopping Inflation May Be Costly
Fig. 1.5 United States, 1940-49.
After 1942:1 the economy was pushed in a southeastern direction in
figure 1.5, reflecting the operation of stringent wartime price controls.
Inflation was held below 5% in each four-quarter period between 1943:2
and 1945:4. Then prices exploded when the wartime controls were ended,
rising at an annual rate of 52% in a single quarter, 1946:3. The 1946-47
price bulge was a much more extreme episode than 1919 and early 1920,
reflecting the greater impact of price controls during World War II. But
perhaps a more interesting difference between the two postwar periods
lies in the more modest extent of the 1949 recession in nominal spending
growth as compared to 1920-21, and in the relatively small 33% absorp-
tion of spending decline by price decline in the four quarters ending in
1949:4.
4. The "flatfifties," 1953-59. We skip the Korean War period, with its
speculative boom in late 1950 and its amazingly low inflation rates in
1951-53 (the latter representing some combination of price-control
effects and the end of the speculative commodity bubble). The next plot24 Robert J. Gordon
Table 1.3 Values of Aggregate Variables
















(figure 1.6a) begins at the peak of the Korean War boom in 1953:2 and
illustrates the low coefficients of price adjustment observed during the
two recessions in 1954 and 1958. Although the pace of nominal GNP
growth was much more irregular than in the simple example of figure
\.\d, it is possible to discern a pattern similar to the dotted "box" in that
earlier diagram, with its flat top and bottom. Again using four-quarter
changes, there was a drop in adjusted nominal GNP growth of 9.6 percent-
age points between 1953:2 and 1954:2, but a reduction in the inflation rate
of only 0.7 points (an "absorption" of only 7%). In the next five quarters
there was an increase of 11.7 percentage points in adjusted nominal GNP
growth but a response in the inflation rate of only 1.1 points. Then a
lagged adjustment began, as in figure \.\d, pushing the economy above
the 45 degree line in late 1956 and early 1957. In the five quarters
following 1957:1, there was a drop in adjusted nominal GNP growth of 6.6
-5
Fig. 1.6 (a) United States, 1953-59. (b) United States, 1959-71. (c)
United States, 1971-80.25 Why Stopping Inflation May Be Costly
percentage points, and in inflation of 2.1 points, for an absorption ratio of
32%, closer to the experience of 1923 and the 1930s than to 1953-55.
Finally, there was little change in the four-quarter inflation rate between
early 1958 and early 1959, perhaps reflecting the offsetting impacts of
positive adjusted nominal demand growth and a negative output gap.
5. The classic period of gradual adjustment and overshooting, 1959-71.
The bulk of the existing econometric evidence on price adjustment in the
79:126 Robert J. Gordon
postwar United States is based on a statistical analysis of the period
between 1953 and the present. The overwhelming consensus is that
inflation adjusts very slowly to nominal demand shocks. It is easy from
our diagrams to see that this pessimistic message is not an artifact of
statistical technique but rather is embedded in the data, particularly for
the interval between 1953 and 1971. Of the 11.3 percentage point swing in
nominal GNP growth between 1959:2 and 1961:1, only 1.8 percentage
points were absorbed in slower inflation. Then, of the 9.1 point swing
from 1961:1 to 1965:4, only 1.9 points were absorbed in faster inflation.
In the period between late 1962 and late 1965 any impact of the output
gap in slowing inflation was completely offset by the impact of positive
adjusted nominal GNP growth. Although some might interpret the
1963-65 evidence as supporting a downward impact on inflation of the
Kennedy-Johnson wage-price guidelines, the adjustment paths do not
seem to be appreciably different from the pre-1963 period when there
were no guidelines.
After 1965:4 the inflation-demand relationship drifts upward in re-
sponse to continued positive rates of adjusted nominal GNP growth,
reflecting the process of lagged adjustment implied by equation (6). After
early 1969 the inflation rate "overshot," rising above the 45 degree line,
just as the adjustment process in the hypothetical cases of figure 1.2
carried the economy temporarily below the 45 degree line. The puzzling
aspect of 1970-71 is the failure of the recession, which brought the level of
real output from 4% above trend to 2.5% below trend, to have any effect
at all in dampening inflation. It was the despair of the Nixon administra-
tion's economy policymakers at the rapid inflation rate of early 1971 that
caused the startling policy reversal of 15 August 1971, when comprehen-
sive price controls were introduced.
6. Untangling demand and supply shocks, 1971-80. Unlike the pre-
vious diagrams, where a clear southwest-to-northeast alignment of the
plotted points can be discerned, the graph for the past decade has a
chaotic appearance. The decade can be divided into two main parts,
according to the main direction of movement, with a northwest-to-
southeast orientation dominating the four-quarter periods between
1971:3 and 1976:1, and a "normal" southwest-to-northeast orientation
occurring from then until late 1979. The decline in the inflation rate
during late 1971 and most of 1972 reflects the initial impact of the Nixon
controls, and the standard interpretation of 1972-76 (Gordon 1977a;
Blinder 1979) is that the temporary positive effect on inflation of the
postcontrol "rebound" in 1974-75 was combined with two other supply
shocks that temporarily raised the inflation rate: the 1972-73 increase in
the relative price of food and the 1973-74 increase in the relative price of
oil. A permanent increase in the level of a relative price may only
temporarily raise the inflation rate if its impact is dampened by restrictive27 Why Stopping Inflation May Be Costly
nominal demand policy and if the extent of cost-of-living escalators in
wage contracts is relatively minor, both of which were conditions that
were satisfied in the United States 1972-76. A contrasting situation is
observed below for some foreign countries, where supply shocks have
permanently raised the inflation rate.
The 1977-80 episode displays a pattern that exhibits some similarity to
1967-70. The upward drift of the inflation-demand plot in 1979-80 to
some extent reflects the impact of the second OPEC oil shock, but also may
provide evidence that the level of real output consistent with a stable
inflation rate has been exaggerated by some investigators, including the
Council of Economic Advisers. If this "natural" rate of output is over-
stated, then the corresponding "natural" unemployment rate may have
been understated. My present estimate of a natural unemployment rate
of 5.6% in 1979 (1981c, appendix B) may be understated by as much as a
percentage point. A resolution of this issue depends on further econo-
metric work that disentangles supply factors in the 1979-80 acceleration
of inflation from the respective roles of the rate of growth and level of
demand.
1.6 The Speed of Adjustment in Other Countries
The speed and extent of inflation's response to changes in nominal
demand growth differs markedly across countries. We shall see that, in
general, the inflation-demand relation clings more closely to the 45
degree line in foreign countries than in the United States. Before this
evidence can be used to make a case that the rapid conquest of inflation is
possible in the United States, however, we must determine whether the
conditions necessary for fast responsiveness can be imported from abroad
and whether this would require major changes in United States institu-
tions.
Although a scattering of data is available that suggests a more rapid
response of European than American prices during the interwar years
(Gordon and Wilcox 1981), we limit the scope of the present paper to a
study of foreign data since 1965 (or 1963 in cases where inflation deceler-
ated between 1963 and 1965). The countries selected are the five major
industrial nations besides the United States (Japan, Germany, France,
Italy, and the United Kingdom), one small nation that has experienced
very low rates of inflation in recent years (Switzerland), and two nations
that have experienced relatively high rates of inflation (Brazil and
Israel).
1 Annual rather than quarterly data are plotted, and the method of
detrending real output growth is extremely crude—one trend is calcu-
lated for 1960-73 and a second trend for 1973-79. To the extent that the
low 1973-79 trends in some countries reflect underutilization of resources
rather than a slowdown in productivity growth, our calculations tend to28 Robert J. Gordon
understate the shortfall of output below trend experienced since 1973. An
important corollary is that a faster "true" output trend would shift
observations that presently lie on the 45 degree line west of that line and
might change our conclusion of easy painless adjustment to one of
prolonged and painful adjustment.
7. West Germany, 1965-80. Economists in most industrial countries
envy the low inflation rates experienced in West Germany in the last half
of the 1970s. Although the success of restrictive monetary policy in the
first few years of the flexible exchange rate era has been much discussed,
an earlier episode of anti-inflationary restrictive policy in 1965-67 de-
serves attention as well. In a famous conference in June 1965, German
trade unions and employers' associations made a tripartite "social con-
tract" with the then-new Council of Economic Advisers that called for a
coordinated slowdown in the growth of nominal wages by two percentage
points by 1967, and an accompanying slowdown in the growth of govern-
ment expenditure and the money supply that would be consistent with a
two percentage point slowdown in inflation. As shown in figure 1.7a, the
inflation target was almost precisely met; the previous "problem" rate,
which was 3.0% in 1964 and 3.5% in 1965, was reduced to 1.4% in 1967.
Economic historians sometimes fail to point out that there was a substan-
tial output cost, due partly to the rejection by the government of the
scenario for its own actions laid out by the council. Herbert Giersch has
called the actual policy response a "Teutonic big bang." Nominal GNP
growth came almost to a dead halt in 1967, and our measure of adjusted
(a) West Germany, 1965-80. (b) Switzerland, 1965-79. (c)
France, 1963-80.29 Why Stopping Inflation May Be Costly
nominal GNP growth fell to - 3.2%. The economy's movement in figure
1.7a displays the same "flat" appearance as most United States episodes.
The absorption of the 1965-67 deceleration of nominal GNP growth in
slower inflation was just 26%, and of the 1967-69 acceleration just 20%.
The 1970 and 1971 experience can be interpreted as a lagged adjust-
ment involving overshooting to the rapid demand growth of 1968-70
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equation (6) above. While in 1972 and 1973 the economy adhered fairly
closely to the 45 degree line, movements since 1973 display the north-
west-to-southeast orientation that is expected when supply shocks are
resisted by monetary policy. The loop that occurred in 1973 through 1976
appears to be almost identical to that in the United States but with a peak
inflation rate of only 7% compared to the United States 1975 calendar-
year peak of 9.3%. The difference partially reflects the absence in Ger-
many of a postcontrols price rebound, as occurred in the United States in
1974-75, and the beneficial impact of the 1973 movement to floating
exchange rates, which was followed by a 20% appreciation of the mark
against the dollar between late 1972 and mid-1976. After 1976 the Ger-
man experience is notable in contrast to the United States for modest
growth in nominal GNP, allowing the economy to maintain itself close to
the 45 degree line for most of the late 1970s. The cost of this policy was
relatively slow output growth of only 2.3% between 1973 and 1979,
compared to 2.8% in the United States. The deceleration in output
growth as compared to 1960-73 was 2.2 percentage points in Germany,
compared to 1.4 percentage points in the United States. The absence of
any marked acceleration of inflation in Germany in 1979, when output
growth was 4.5%, suggests that Germany may have operated beneath its
"natural" level of real output throughout the late 1970s and that points in
figure 1.7a for 1977-80 should be shifted slightly west of their plotted
position.
8. Switzerland, 1965-79. The Swiss experience is similar to the Ger-
man in most respects. Among the differences are the milder Swiss reces-
sion in 1967, the higher peak rates of inflation reached in 1971-72, and the
much sharper recession experienced in 1975. The adjustment paths for
Switzerland between 1965 and 1973 adhere quite closely to the 45 degree
line, with the ratio of output to its trend ranging only between 97.1 and
101.6%. This story of stability ended after 1973 with a period of extreme
monetary restriction when Swiss Ml actually fell in nominal terms during
both 1974 and 1975; inflation decelerated from a peak of 9.7% in 1972 to
only 0.4% in 1977. The cost of this "cold turkey" remedy was an incredi-
ble reduction in output which is disguised by the negative 1973-79 output
trend used in figure 1 Jb. Calculated with reference to the 1965-73 output
trend of 4.0%, the ratio of output to trend fell from 100% in 1973 to
74.4% in 1979. Calculated with reference to a 3% trend, the same ratio
fell to 80%.
Thus Switzerland managed to cure its inflation problem by creating a
veritable depression in real output, an achievement that was feasible
politically because of the freedom to export guestworkers back to Italy
and other southern countries. The Swiss depression was considerably
more severe than in Germany, where the output ratio fell to 87% in 1979
calculated at the 1965-73 trend and to 93% calculated at a more reason-31 Why Stopping Inflation May Be Costly
able 3% trend. On the same basis the respective United States ratios in
1979 were 94 and 99%. The plotted points after 1974 in figure 1.1b may
make the Swiss adjustment process appear to have been deceptively
painless, because they employ a negative rate of trend output growth of
— 0.3% per annum. If we substitute instead the German 1973-79 trend of
+ 2.3% per annum, the Swiss experience follows the path of the dashed
line after 1973, and we observe a continued failure to achieve trend
output growth despite an acceleration of inflation from zero percent in
1977 to 4% in 1979.
9. France, 1963-79. Although much of the French literature on infla-
tion minimizes the causal role of changes in the growth rates of nominal
money and spending, and treats inflation entirely as the result of a
struggle over income shares, the inflation-demand relation displayed in
figure 1.7c clings more tightly to the 45 degree line than in any of the
episodes discussed so far. As must occur by definition when a plot of
inflation and nominal demand growth moves back and forth along the 45
degree line, the growth of real output in each year remains very close to
its trend. Between 1960 and 1973 the French output trend grew at 5.6%
per annum, and there was no year in which the actual growth rate of
output fell short of 4.3% or exceeded 6.7%.
A close correlation between nominal demand and price changes does
not imply that the direction of causation necessarily runs from the former
to the latter. The regular relation observed between 1963 and 1973 in
figure 1.7c might simply reflect autonomous changes in the rate of infla-
tion due to variations in the intensity of the battle over income shares (or,
more specifically, the timing of episodes of "wage push"), followed by
prompt monetary accommodation of these pressures. In the language
that I have used elsewhere, a "demand for inflation" may bring forth its
own "supply of inflation" (Gordon 1975).
However plausible, the price-leads-nominal demand direction of
causation is not supported by the evidence. The first episode of decelerat-
ing inflation between 1963 and 1965, roughly two years in advance of the
similar German experience, was the direct result of a ceiling imposed on
the rate of growth of bank credit between mid-1963 and mid-1965. The
growth rate of French Ml dropped from 18% in 1962 to 8% in 1964. The
inflation rate followed along a year later and fell by more than half, from
6.4% in 1963 to 2.7% in 1965. In a statistical study that attempted to
allocate credit for this deceleration between monetary policy and in-
comes policy (of which a mild version was in effect in 1964 and 1965), I
found a strong role for the former and almost no impact of the latter
(Gordon 19776).
The best-known single episode in the history of postwar French infla-
tion occurred in June 1968, when the Protocole de Grenelle between the
government and unions allowed manufacturing wages to jump. Yet this32 Robert J. Gordon
clear episode of wage push was not backed by an accommodative mone-
tary policy. After an initial burst of spending and inflation in 1969, as
workers consumed their newly won gains, monetary policy turned
quickly toward restriction (Ml actually fell in 1969). As a result, spending
growth fell in 1970 and 1971 by enough to bring the economy back to the
45 degree line.
The evolution of the French economy in the 1970s exhibits interesting
differences from the United States, German, and Swiss experiences.
There was a modest accommodation of the first OPEC oil shock, with Ml
growth jumping from 10% in 1973 to 15 and 12.5% in 1974 and 1975,
respectively. Inflation doubled from 1973 to 1975, whereas inflation
remained roughly at the same level in Germany and fell in Switzerland.
The French authorities avoided an output bloodbath, as in Germany and
Switzerland, and as a result endowed the economy with an inflation of
about 10% during the 1976-80 period. The diagram of the French experi-
ence may give a misleading impression of an effortless adjustment, since
the output trend used in the calculations dropped from 5.6% for 1960-73
to only 3.0% for 1973-79. The parallel upward movement of inflation and
nominal demand growth between 1977 and 1979 does not suggest a major
underutilization of capacity, however, if equation (6) has any relevance
as a description of the French economy.
10. Japan, 1965-80. The Japanese export and productivity miracles
have recently been joined by the Japanese inflation miracle; the GNP
deflator rose only 2% in 1979 and by about the same amount in 1980. The
plot of Japanese data in figure 1.8a illustrates a continual tilting of the
inflation-demand relation, from a virtually horizontal slope in the expan-
sion of nominal GNP growth between 1965 and 1970, to a slight upward tilt
in the cycle between 1970 and 1972, to a 45 degree relation since then.
Previous analyses of Japanese monetary policy in the fixed-exchange-rate
era support an interpretation of an activist policy that promptly reduced
the growth of the money supply in response to accelerations in output
growth and deteriorations in the balance of payments. There was almost
no response of the inflation rate to marked drops in nominal GNP growth
in 1965 and again in 1971, and increases in the GNP deflator remained
within the narrow range of 4.4 to 5.5% in every year between 1963 and
1972, with the single exception of 1970.
Japanese inflation broke out of its stable mold only once in the last two
decades, when a 25% wage increase was granted in the 1974 spring wage
offensive (Sachs 1979). While inflation ballooned in 1975, there was no
monetary accommodation of the combined wage-oil shock. Ml growth
dropped from 30% in 1970 to 11% in both 1974 and 1975. As in the case of
Germany and Switzerland, the introduction of flexible exchange rates in
1973 allowed the Japanese to regain control of their money supply. The
impact of restrained monetary growth on the exchange rate, which33 Why Stopping Inflation May Be Costly
appreciated against the dollar by 52% between 1972 and late 1978, helps
to explain why the inflation rate in Japan continued to slow down while
growth in real output proceeded at a steady 5.5 to 6.5% pace beginning in
1976. A remaining puzzle is how the Japanese avoided any acceleration
of inflation as a consequence of the decline in the yen by roughly 10%
between the last half of 1978 and the last half of 1980. A possible
explanation is that the 4% rate of output growth used in figure 1.8a for the
period 1973-79 (compared to 10.2% for 1960-73) substantially under-
states the true trend and that the deceleration of inflation in the late 1970s
reflects a continuing adjustment to an underutilization of resources.
Another possibility is that Japanese unions are exhibiting deliberate
restraint now to avoid an inflationary response to the second 1979-80 oil
shock (Wall Street Journal, 6 February 1981).
11. United Kingdom, 1965-80. Although a band of monetarists fights a
rearguard action, nowhere as in Britain is the view so entrenched that
inflation results from an autonomous struggle over income shares. Perry
(1975) and I (19776), in econometric equations that allow for an impact of
aggregate demand on wages, have found convincing evidence of an
alternating series of episodes of incomes policy followed by autonomous
wage push. In the 1965-72 period the British inflation-demand relation
marched quite firmly along the 45 degree line in figure 1.8b, with only
minor fluctuations in the growth rate of output. Since there was no lag
between demand and inflation (as in France in 1963-65 or Germany in
1965-69), it is plausible to conclude that monetary policy accommodated
an autonomous inflation cycle caused by wage push and an accelerating
inflation in world traded goods prices. The institutions of British mone-
tary control (or "noncontrol") were firmly wedded to pegging interest
rates and allowed monetary accommodation to occur without much
thought about alternative responses.
Of all the cases studied thus far, the British shows the clearest evidence
that the 1974-75 oil shock was accommodated. Ml growth jumped from
5% in 1973 to 19% in 1975, and nominal GNP growth (unadjusted)
jumped from 10% in 1972 to 24% in 1975. This experience can be
compared to unadjusted 1975 nominal GNP growth rates of 8% in the
United States, 5% in Germany, and - 1% in Switzerland. The move-
ment down the 45 degree line in 1975 through 1978 reflects a coordinated
policy reminiscent of Germany in 1965, with unions accepting lower wage
increases under a "social contract," while monetary growth was deceler-
ated under pressure from the International Monetary Fund. Monetary
restriction in turn spurred a recovery in the value of the pound sterling
from its low reached in October 1976, and the ensuing reduction in the
inflation rate of import prices helped the social contract to remain in place
until 1978. Finally, the 1979-80 acceleration of inflation traces a pattern












Fig. 1.8 (a) Japan, 1965-80. (b) United Kingdom, 1965-80.
consisting of excessive public-sector wage agreements granted by the
departing Labor government in early 1979 and large increases in indirect
taxes introduced by the new Conservative government in late 1979. These
influences appear to have swamped the beneficial impact on inflation of
the 30% appreciation in the pound sterling that occurred between mid-
1978 and mid-1980.35 Why Stopping Inflation May Be Costly
12. Italy, 1963-80. The history of postwar Italian inflation is full of
references to two major episodes of wage push, a so-called wage explo-
sion in 1963 and a period of labor strife called "the hot autumn of 1969."
My previous study (1977b) of quarterly wage and monetary change data
found significant evidence of autonomous movements in wage rates in
1963 and the beginning of 1970. An important similarity between the two
episodes was the anti-inflationary reaction of monetary policy, with the
growth rate of Ml falling by more than half between 1962 and 1964, and
by one-third between 1970 and 1971. The downward response of the
inflation rate in 1963-66 in figure 1.9 follows a classic "loop" like those
drawn in figure 1.2, with a cumulative decline in output relative to a trend
of about 4.5%. In 1971-72 the response of inflation was almost nonexis-
tent, possibly because of the ongoing acceleration of world traded goods
prices. As a result the cumulative decline in detrended output between
1969 and 1972 amounted to about 6%.
Since 1973 Italy has moved back and forth along the 45 degree line in
figure 1.9, with its rapid adjustment facilitated by the interaction of wage
indexation (the scala mobile), flexible exchange rates, and monetary
accommodation. The Italian response to the first oil shock of 1973—7
r4
shows the permanent acceleration of inflation that we expect to occur
when a supply shock strikes an economy that has a high degree of wage
indexation. Several of the details of the Italian response after 1973
duplicate the British, so much so that in 1977 the Economist labeled Italy
"Europe's other Britain." The inflation rate decelerated in both coun-
tries from a peak in 1975 to a trough in 1978, partly under pressure from
the International Monetary Fund, and both experienced another accel-
eration of inflation in 1979 and 1980. In the case of Italy the 1979-80
acceleration was accommodated by monetary policy, perhaps reflecting
the political weakness of the government, whereas the strong Parliamen-
tary position of the Thatcher government allowed a partially successful
attempt to slow down monetary growth. It will be interesting over the
next two years to learn whether this political divergence between Britain
and Italy will also cause a growing and permanent divergence in their
inflation rates.
13. Brazil, 1960-80. The 1960-70 cycle in Brazil provides an example
of a classic money-fueled aggregate demand inflation. After remaining in
a range of 12 to 16% from 1947 to 1958/inflation began to accelerate in
response to the heavy money-financed requirements of Kubitschek's
1959 "Target Plan." Although the source of accelerating inflation was
recognized, no government before the April 1964 revolution had the
political courage to carry out an effective stabilization plan for fear of
causing recession, unemployment, and a drop in the growth rate of real
income. There was also a belief that inflation was an effective mechanism















recession which actually occurred can be divided into two stages, an
initial period before the 1964 revolution during which the nation's inter-
national bankruptcy, as well as the inefficiency caused by a near 100%
inflation rate, had undermined the operation of the economy, and a
second stage in which monetary and credit restriction led to bankruptcies
and liquidity crises. Over the five years between 1963 and 1967 real GNP
fell cumulatively 19.7% below its 1960-73 trend. This shortfall was
gradually made up during 1968-73, when double-digit rates of real output
growth were achieved in all years but one. The cost of the Brazilian
experiment in price stabilization appears to be deceptively small in figure
1.10, but this reflects the enormous variance of inflation and correspond-
ingly large scale of the diagram. After 1971 inflation steadily accelerated.
Initially this may have occurred as a result of the exuberant growth of real
output in 1972 and 1973, but since that year must have reflected (as in
Italy) the insidious interaction of supply shocks, wage indexation, flexible
exchange rates, and monetary accommodation.













territory of triple-digit inflation. This continues an acceleration process
that began in 1970 and has been interrupted since then only during 1976.
Figure 1.11 illustrates an interesting change from the flat adjustment
relation displayed for 1965-69 to the 45 degree relation displayed since
1970. As in Brazil and Italy, the supply shocks of the 1970s, when
combined with a high degree of wage indexation and flexible exchange
rates, have forced governments to choose between large output losses
and a continuing acceleration of inflation. The process will end only when
politicians can convince their constituents to accept a decline in real
income, as occurred in 1974-75 when Germany, Switzerland, and the
United States used monetary restriction to battle the permanent in-
flationary consequences of supply shocks.
1.7 Conclusion
Throughout the twentieth century, with a single exception during and
after World War I, United States inflation has responded slowly to38 Robert J. Gordon
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Israel, 1965-79.
changes in the growth of nominal aggregate demand. Many commenta-
tors—including Fellner (1979) with his "credibility hypothesis," Lucas
(1978) and his followers with their "policy ineffectiveness proposition,"
and some advisers to the new administration—accept as an article of faith
that inflation will decelerate promptly in response to a sustained slow-
down in the growth of nominal spending. Yet the wide variety of evidence
for the United States arrayed in figures 1.3-1.6 demonstrates that the
phenomenon of partial and gradual price adjustment transcends changes
in "policy regimes" and has characterized the United States in every
episode from Coolidge to Carter.
There is a widespread impression that inflation is more responsive to
demand disturbances in foreign countries than in the United States. Yet
there are only four episodes of those surveyed in this paper that exhibit all
of the following characteristics: (a) a marked slowdown of inflation, (b)39 Why Stopping Inflation May Be Costly
achieved by restrictive demand policy, (c) and with only a "minor" loss in
output:




There are no such episodes in the United States since 1922, and instead
abundant evidence that only 10 to 40% of nominal demand changes are
absorbed by the inflation rate in the first year after such changes. A more
surprising conclusion is that there are no other examples of such success-
ful low-cost episodes of stopping inflation in other countries. Restrictive
policy slowed down inflation in Germany in 1965-67 and 1973-76, but
only at the cost of a substantial loss in real output. The Swiss policy of
tight money may seem socially costless to first-time tourists, but the 17%
decline in manufacturing employment between 1974 and 1978 and the
- 0.3% annual real GNP trend recorded between 1973 and 1979 imposed
a substantial cost on both current Swiss residents and now-departed guest
workers. The Brazilian struggle to bring inflation from 90% in 1964 to
17% in 1971 required output to fall about 20% below trend during the
period of adjustment. While the United Kingdom episode between 1975
and 1978 might be cited as a successful experiment, restrictive demand
management policy was combined with a "social contract" between the
Labor government and its labor union supporters; the relevance of this
linkage for current United States policymakers, who are uniformly
opposed to government intervention in the wage-price process, seems
dubious at best. Finally, the experience over the past decade of France,
Italy, Brazil, and Israel provides no guidance for stopping inflation, since
all four countries accommodated the first OPEC oil shock and are still
experiencing the permanent acceleration of inflation that resulted from
their earlier policy decisions.
Not only are there few successful anti-inflationary episodes in the
available historical evidence, leaving aside the hyperinflations reviewed
by Sargent, but each of the four listed above has limited relevance to the
United States in 1981. Our own experience during 1916-22 predated the
advent of three-year staggered union wage contracts, which has intro-
duced an extra delay into the responsiveness of the United States infla-
tion process. The success of Japan since 1976 has resulted from a union
bargaining structure in which contracts last only a year and expire simul-
taneously and in which unions appear to have entered into an implicit
social contract with the monetary policy authorities. This would appear to
leave the experience of France and Italy in the early 1960s as the last
refuge of the optimist.40 Robert J. Gordon
Note
1. Data through 1979 for other countries come from the International Financial Statistics,
and 1980 estimates for some countries are from the OECD Economic Outlook, December
1980.
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